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Nascent Drama

Karl Griggs
Philosophy 1
Prof. Johnson
23 July, 2008
Response: God, Evil, and the Best of All Possible Worlds
 
Leibniz’s God, Evil, and the Best of All Possible Worlds attempts to explain the apparent contradiction of God, an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient being, creating a world which appears to be less than optimal. If God is both omnipotent and omnibenevolent (all-good), why would he create evil, which is in opposition to benevolence? Leibniz proposes that God made the world the best it could possibly be, and thus evil is an essential part of that.
 
For God to be God He has to maintain perfect qualities, so lowering any of them is not an answer to the problem. Neither is discounting the existence of God, so evil has to fit with God’s perfections. Because God is omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent, then, it stands to reason that He created the best possible world out of all the possibilities. Because existing is better than not existing, creation would be preferable to non-creation, and without evil to challenge it, there would be nothing to differentiate good and it would essentially be meaningless.
 
Thus Leibniz arrives at the conclusion that, without violating any of his perfect qualities, God created the best world out of all possible choices, and in order to be the best, it needed evil to give goodness a meaning. Finally, Leibniz responds to his critics’ claim that God put too much evil and suffering in the world for it to be the best possible by saying that even if evil is more common than good, the magnitude of that good is more than enough the counteract all of the evil.
 
Roderic Chisholm’s Human Freedom and the Self attempts to solve the problems raised by determinism and indeterminism in regards to responsibility and freewill. Determinism raises the issue of assigning responsibility – if every action is caused by another, how are the man’s actions his fault? Whether he shoots somebody is as much his fault as if he was battered against that same person by a giant, yet he’d still be given the moral responsibility. Indeterminism says that actions are not caused at all, and if that is the case, how can anybody be responsible for any actions? Responsibility then appears to require a cause, but deterministic causation seems to absolve the man of responsibility.
 
Chisholm’s “agent causation” concept is simple: in the case of a shooting, the shooter pulling the trigger wasn’t caused by any other action, but by the agent’s decision. Thus, the agent has moral responsibility for his act, having caused it by his decision, because he could have chosen any number of other options.
 
Chisholm critiques the compatibilist claim that “He could have done otherwise” means the same thing as “If he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise” by saying that, while the second statement is compatible with determinism, the first is not, and thus the two have different meanings. The two could only function together if “He could have chosen to do otherwise” was true, but that’s impossible with determinism, because his choice would have been caused and thus not under his control.
 
Total Posts: 307

Kitty 126
Dual 102
classichummus 39
Conchaga 16
Bickendan 12
Douche Pukehole 7
The Dork Lord 2
Pandora 2
Love Child 1
 
In his Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, Frankfurt establishes his concept of a person not necessarily being linked to the species Homo Sapien. He says that it is conceptually possible for members of non-human species to have the qualities of personhood, and, also, for humans to lack the qualities of personhood.
 
There are three components of personhood that must coexist within the agent for it to be considered a person. The first is what Frankfurt calls first order desires. These desires exist in all animals and are for basic things like food, water, or doing well in school. The second, second order desires, are to do things such as homework or wipe off one’s kitchen counter. If the agent has a corresponding first order desire (doing well in school or having a clean house, respectively) the second order desires can be realized; if not, they will become meaningless and fall away. The third part is second order volitions. Second order volitions exist independently of first order desires and are able to motivate the agent on their own. The agent willfully identifies itself with the volition (wanting to want it), and thus is a person.
 
In Frankfurt’s view, only the person will all three qualities41 of personhood has freedom of the will, and thus Wantons (beings lacking second order desires) and creatures with only first order desires, and, lacking free will, these non-persons also lack moral responsibility.
 
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