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its a good night to spam

I hate wet, humid weather....even in the shower i feel filthy.... disgusting crocodile coming out of sewers weather
 
:mmm pancakes:

5amDrIVe ThRu MiSsIoNs...

'Ohai, pancakes plox'

VoIcE BoX: 'no...10min"

meh...brb....

10min L8r.....'PaNcAkEs PLOX'

VoIcE BoX: 'no pancakes...20min'

'Listin cunt, ur making it vry hard to b a law abiding citizen right now, gimme my fucking pancakes or give me ur fucking manager'

VoIcE BoX: 'k...here's ur pancakes for free...kthnx'

cocksuker
 
Wikileaks fucking roxors



S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000523

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER, STATE FOR NEA/ELA,

EO 12958 DECL: 04/16/2018
TAGS PTER, ECPS, PINR, LE, IR, SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HIZBALLAH GOES FIBER OPTIC

REF: BEIRUT 490

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Michele Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY

¶1. (S) Requesting a special meeting with Charge, Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamadeh decried the establishment of a complete fiber optics network by Hizballah throughout Lebanon. The GOL has been sharing this information widely among friends of Lebanon, to include the governments of France, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE. Hamadeh sees only two choices for the GOL: approach the UN Security Council, or use the “cover” of March 14-friendly municipalities to cut the lines. However, he questioned whether the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) have the “guts” to do so, given that Hizballah already stated to Lebanese security officials that it would view this as equal to an Israeli act of aggression, and would then take action against the GOL. Hamadeh hopes that Saad Hariri, now in Geneva, will return soon to Lebanon so that March 14 can meet to formulate a strategy. End summary.

GOL HAS BEEN SHARING HIZBALLAH FIBER OPTIC MAP, REPORT WIDELY
-------------

¶2. (S) &Iran Telecom is taking over the country!8 were the first words out of the mouth of Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh when he met with Charge and Econoff on April 16. He was referring to the discovery of a complete fiber optic system (FiOS) installed by Hizballah throughout Lebanon - reftel. In addition, Hizballah has introduced Wi-Max in Beirut’s southern suburbs. Hamadeh pointed out that although Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) television had run a story the previous night about the Hizballah FiOS network, it was already widely known. The LBC story was not planted by the GOL, nor planned, but in Hamadeh’s opinion it was no bad thing to get the story out there. Hamadeh himself has been sharing the news both within the GOL and outside, with &friends,8 which includes the Arab countries, the U.S., France (Sarkozy was &stunned”) and Terje Roed-Larsen of the UN. He briefed Bernard Kouchner, Jean-David Levitte, Boris Bouillon and Michel Barnier while in Paris. In Beirut he spoke to Charge Andre Parent of France and Ambassador Abdul Aziz Khoja of Saudi Arabia. Saad Hariri, when he heard, sent a private plane from Saudi Arabia to pick up a copy of the map, which traces in detail the route of the system, to share with Saudi King Abdullah and Intelligence Chief Prince Mukrin bin Abdul-Aziz. PM Siniora briefed the Jordanians and Emiratis, as well as Arab League SYG Amr Musa on the network during his recent trip around the region, Hamadeh confirmed. Within Lebanon Hamadeh says that the first person he told, after the Prime Minister and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt was Maronite Patriarch Sfeir. Hamadeh described the strategic implications of the Hizballah plan, which he says is targeting the Christian areas, despite a denial of that by Hizballah. In addition to Hamadeh and PM Siniora, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Defense Minister Michel Murr have been active in the GL information campaign on the network.

INTERFERENCE IN TELECOMS LINKED TO NETWORK
-----------------

¶3. (S) While the confrontation over the FiOS system was taking place with Hizballah, mobile telecommunications were being subject to interference by Syria in the north, Israel in the south and possibly by the UN at sea, according to Hamadeh. The information about Israeli interference was passed &unofficially8 by UNIFIL, since, in a recurring complaint by Hamadeh during the conversation, the LAF has not reported any problems officially. The Syrian interference is similar to that occurring during the Nahr al-Barid fighting, and highlights the ability of the Syrians to communicate within Lebanon through non-Lebanese mobile systems. Because the system in the part of Syria bordering on northern Lebanon is a private company, MTM, Hamadeh believes that they offer political cover to the Syrian government, who he nevertheless believes is behind the problem. Hamadeh views these events as part of the same strategic interference in Lebanon, both internally and externally. Hamadeh has a map that delineates
BEIRUT 00000523 002 OF 004
the interference, in an arc that runs from the north to the south of Lebanon.

MARCH 14 NEEDS TO MEET, BUT SAAD SHOULD BE THERE
------------------------

¶4. (S) Hamadeh said that he, the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Elias Murr are all danger, but he and Murr will take the biggest risk in exposing the Hizballah FiOS network. Hamadeh told the PM that he could not assume the risk alone for a showdown with Hizballah. He also used the risk of physical harm as a deterrent with Jumblatt, who wanted to hold a press conference to expose the Hizballah system. Hamadeh believes that this is a March 14 issue, and cannot be resolved without the participation of Saad Hariri. Hamadeh complained that there has not yet been either a March 14 meeting or a cabinet meeting to discuss this matter. He says he asked for such discussions in a meeting with PM Siniora April 15, and will raise it again when they meet April 16. Hamadeh also discussed the issue with Larsen, whom he met with recently in Paris, although he did not give Larsen the map. If the GOL decides to raise the issue with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) he will then provide the map, said Hamadeh.

HIZBALLAH RESPONSE - DON’T TOUCH!
--------------

¶5. (S) Hamadeh reported that LAF G-2 Brigadier General Georges Khoury and ISF Major General Ashraf Rifi saw Wafiq Safa, the Hizballah liaison to the Lebanese intelligence services, together. Khoury asked Safa to take down two parts of the network as a first step; Safa refused. Safa stated that the network is part of Hizballah’s ability to defend Lebanon, and that Hizballah would regard any attack on the network as an act of aggression. However, PM Siniora only got a written report from Khoury ten days after the meeting, Hamadeh complained. Even then, the report was unsigned and thus returned to Khoury for signature. According to their report, Hizballah argued that the PM, Hamadeh and Murr are only raising the issue of the FiOS system in order to bring up the issue of Hizballah weapons. Safa stated categorically that the FiOS system is not up for discussion because it is a key part of the Hizballah arsenal. Safa freely acknowledged to Rifi and Khoury that the network exists. It could only be discussed as part of a defense strategy, he said, adding that the network has no commercial or trade implications. He maintained that it does not penetrate the Christian areas.

HIZBALLAH ASSERTIONS UNTRUE
-----------------

¶6. (S) Hamadeh believes both Hizballah assertions to be untrue. He refutes the Hizballah claim that the system exists solely to give them defensive communications throughout the country, saying that there are &centrales8 or hubs in many villages along the route, and no doubt these have lines running off to other villages and residences. He also believes that Hizballah crews are only waiting for the snows in the Christian regions of Metn and Kswaran to melt before completing penetration of these regions from the east.

WORK DONE UNDER VARIOUS FORMS OF COVER
-----------------

¶7. (S) To complete the installations and at the same time stay below the radar, Hamadeh says that Hizballah has used the municipalities to issue local permits. For example, in Sidon they are working under the cover provided by Abdel Rahman Bizri, the mayor. In another case the Ministry of Energy issued a permit for work that was &to reinforce energy lines,8 although Hamadeh says that was clearly not true. Hamadeh says that the whole of the Bekaa valley was done with local permits, and installations were done by different groups, each unaware of what the others were doing. However, he also says that some of the work was done with the knowledge of resigned Minister of Energy Fneish, a Hizballah member.

DISCOVERY AND REPORT
--------------------

¶8. (S) The first official report was from the region of
BEIRUT 00000523 003 OF 004
Chouifat, which reported installation of an unknown fiber optic system, and asked the Minister of the Interior to stop it. No one did anything because, in Hamadeh’s opinion, they &had no guts.8 At the time of the earlier exposure of the Hizballah telephone lines running through Beirut, and even along the wall of the French embassy, the GOL asked Hizballah to remove those lines, which Hizballah did, and Hamadeh said that he believed at the time that would be the end of the network in the south. The full Ministry of Telecommunications report on the system was compiled by engineers in the ministry and othersXXXXXXXXXXXX who Hamadeh believes could be in great danger because of the report. Once again Hamadeh pointed out that there were no official reports yet from ISF Major General Rifi or LAF G-2 Brigadier General Khoury.

FUNDING FROM IRAN
-----------------

¶9. (S) The current installations, as per the map Hamadeh has given us, shows lines running from Beirut, around both sides of the airport, into the south below the Litani and back up through the Bekaa valley to the far north. It covers the Palestinian camps, and the Hizballah training camps in the Bekaa, and is penetrating deep into the Christian Metn and Ksarwan areas. Although Hamadeh says he has &a few names,8 he did not list the companies who are responsible for the installation, but said that information would be made available shortly. He cited the Iranian Fund for the Reconstruction of Lebanon as the source of the funding. This same group has been rebuilding roads and bridges since the July 2006 war with Israel, and has been accused before of installing telecommunications lines in parallel with new roads. Hamadeh said that he wants to get the list of companies involved and black list them with the GOL.

STRATEGIC VICTORY
-----------------

¶10. (S) Hamadeh highlights the system as a strategic victory for Iran, since it creates an important Iranian outpost in Lebanon, bypassing Syria. He sees the value for the Iranians as strategic, rather than technical or economic. The value for Hizballah is the final step in creating a nation state. Hizballah now has an army and weapons; a television station; an education system; hospitals; social services; a financial system; and a telecommunications system. As a sign of its confidence Hizballah official Safa told Khoury and Rifi that any move against the FiOS system would be taken as &an Israeli attack8 and dealt with accordingly. When Khoury and Rifi pointed out that the people in the area might not accept this and might show hostility to Hizballah in this case, Safa replied, &We don’t care; we will accept hostile reactions.8 At that point, according to Hamadeh, the GOL decided it needed to inform its friends and make a decision on the next steps to be taken.

HAMADEH PREPARES INTERNAL CAMPAIGN
-----------------

¶11. (S) Meanwhile, Hamadeh is preparing a &very strong8 internal campaign. This campaign, he said, has the potential to &destroy8 Aoun and mobilize Christians, as well as influence those Shia who are already beginning to worry about Hizballah. He is waiting for a March 14 meeting to discuss this campaign. Saad has apparently traveled to London and Geneva this week, and is expected to be back in Riyadh by 4/20. Saad has been out of Lebanon for some several weeks and it is not known when he will return. Hamadeh sees only two choices for the GOL: approach the UN Security Council directly, or take on Hizballah by cutting lines. But do the Lebanese security forces have the “guts” for that, or are they frightened by Safa’s statement that those actions would be considered an act of aggression, he wonders.

¶12. (S) Comment: Last year, when Hamadeh’s telecommunications ministry “discovered” the well-known Hizballah telephone system, including the line strung along the wall of the French embassy, he maintained that the GOL would not tolerate the erosion of its “last monopoly” by Hizballah, However, aside from the ceremonial cutting of the French embassy line, there was no further action. This time around, it appears that by sharing as widely as possible the details of the plan, the GOL may hope that someone else will take on the challenge. End cmment.
BEIRUT 00000523 004 OF 004
 
Wikileaks fucking roxors



S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000523

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER, STATE FOR NEA/ELA,

EO 12958 DECL: 04/16/2018
TAGS PTER, ECPS, PINR, LE, IR, SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HIZBALLAH GOES FIBER OPTIC

REF: BEIRUT 490

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Michele Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY

¶1. (S) Requesting a special meeting with Charge, Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamadeh decried the establishment of a complete fiber optics network by Hizballah throughout Lebanon. The GOL has been sharing this information widely among friends of Lebanon, to include the governments of France, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE. Hamadeh sees only two choices for the GOL: approach the UN Security Council, or use the “cover” of March 14-friendly municipalities to cut the lines. However, he questioned whether the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) have the “guts” to do so, given that Hizballah already stated to Lebanese security officials that it would view this as equal to an Israeli act of aggression, and would then take action against the GOL. Hamadeh hopes that Saad Hariri, now in Geneva, will return soon to Lebanon so that March 14 can meet to formulate a strategy. End summary.

GOL HAS BEEN SHARING HIZBALLAH FIBER OPTIC MAP, REPORT WIDELY
-------------

¶2. (S) &Iran Telecom is taking over the country!8 were the first words out of the mouth of Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh when he met with Charge and Econoff on April 16. He was referring to the discovery of a complete fiber optic system (FiOS) installed by Hizballah throughout Lebanon - reftel. In addition, Hizballah has introduced Wi-Max in Beirut’s southern suburbs. Hamadeh pointed out that although Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) television had run a story the previous night about the Hizballah FiOS network, it was already widely known. The LBC story was not planted by the GOL, nor planned, but in Hamadeh’s opinion it was no bad thing to get the story out there. Hamadeh himself has been sharing the news both within the GOL and outside, with &friends,8 which includes the Arab countries, the U.S., France (Sarkozy was &stunned”) and Terje Roed-Larsen of the UN. He briefed Bernard Kouchner, Jean-David Levitte, Boris Bouillon and Michel Barnier while in Paris. In Beirut he spoke to Charge Andre Parent of France and Ambassador Abdul Aziz Khoja of Saudi Arabia. Saad Hariri, when he heard, sent a private plane from Saudi Arabia to pick up a copy of the map, which traces in detail the route of the system, to share with Saudi King Abdullah and Intelligence Chief Prince Mukrin bin Abdul-Aziz. PM Siniora briefed the Jordanians and Emiratis, as well as Arab League SYG Amr Musa on the network during his recent trip around the region, Hamadeh confirmed. Within Lebanon Hamadeh says that the first person he told, after the Prime Minister and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt was Maronite Patriarch Sfeir. Hamadeh described the strategic implications of the Hizballah plan, which he says is targeting the Christian areas, despite a denial of that by Hizballah. In addition to Hamadeh and PM Siniora, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Defense Minister Michel Murr have been active in the GL information campaign on the network.

INTERFERENCE IN TELECOMS LINKED TO NETWORK
-----------------

¶3. (S) While the confrontation over the FiOS system was taking place with Hizballah, mobile telecommunications were being subject to interference by Syria in the north, Israel in the south and possibly by the UN at sea, according to Hamadeh. The information about Israeli interference was passed &unofficially8 by UNIFIL, since, in a recurring complaint by Hamadeh during the conversation, the LAF has not reported any problems officially. The Syrian interference is similar to that occurring during the Nahr al-Barid fighting, and highlights the ability of the Syrians to communicate within Lebanon through non-Lebanese mobile systems. Because the system in the part of Syria bordering on northern Lebanon is a private company, MTM, Hamadeh believes that they offer political cover to the Syrian government, who he nevertheless believes is behind the problem. Hamadeh views these events as part of the same strategic interference in Lebanon, both internally and externally. Hamadeh has a map that delineates
BEIRUT 00000523 002 OF 004
the interference, in an arc that runs from the north to the south of Lebanon.

MARCH 14 NEEDS TO MEET, BUT SAAD SHOULD BE THERE
------------------------

¶4. (S) Hamadeh said that he, the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Elias Murr are all danger, but he and Murr will take the biggest risk in exposing the Hizballah FiOS network. Hamadeh told the PM that he could not assume the risk alone for a showdown with Hizballah. He also used the risk of physical harm as a deterrent with Jumblatt, who wanted to hold a press conference to expose the Hizballah system. Hamadeh believes that this is a March 14 issue, and cannot be resolved without the participation of Saad Hariri. Hamadeh complained that there has not yet been either a March 14 meeting or a cabinet meeting to discuss this matter. He says he asked for such discussions in a meeting with PM Siniora April 15, and will raise it again when they meet April 16. Hamadeh also discussed the issue with Larsen, whom he met with recently in Paris, although he did not give Larsen the map. If the GOL decides to raise the issue with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) he will then provide the map, said Hamadeh.

HIZBALLAH RESPONSE - DON’T TOUCH!
--------------

¶5. (S) Hamadeh reported that LAF G-2 Brigadier General Georges Khoury and ISF Major General Ashraf Rifi saw Wafiq Safa, the Hizballah liaison to the Lebanese intelligence services, together. Khoury asked Safa to take down two parts of the network as a first step; Safa refused. Safa stated that the network is part of Hizballah’s ability to defend Lebanon, and that Hizballah would regard any attack on the network as an act of aggression. However, PM Siniora only got a written report from Khoury ten days after the meeting, Hamadeh complained. Even then, the report was unsigned and thus returned to Khoury for signature. According to their report, Hizballah argued that the PM, Hamadeh and Murr are only raising the issue of the FiOS system in order to bring up the issue of Hizballah weapons. Safa stated categorically that the FiOS system is not up for discussion because it is a key part of the Hizballah arsenal. Safa freely acknowledged to Rifi and Khoury that the network exists. It could only be discussed as part of a defense strategy, he said, adding that the network has no commercial or trade implications. He maintained that it does not penetrate the Christian areas.

HIZBALLAH ASSERTIONS UNTRUE
-----------------

¶6. (S) Hamadeh believes both Hizballah assertions to be untrue. He refutes the Hizballah claim that the system exists solely to give them defensive communications throughout the country, saying that there are &centrales8 or hubs in many villages along the route, and no doubt these have lines running off to other villages and residences. He also believes that Hizballah crews are only waiting for the snows in the Christian regions of Metn and Kswaran to melt before completing penetration of these regions from the east.

WORK DONE UNDER VARIOUS FORMS OF COVER
-----------------

¶7. (S) To complete the installations and at the same time stay below the radar, Hamadeh says that Hizballah has used the municipalities to issue local permits. For example, in Sidon they are working under the cover provided by Abdel Rahman Bizri, the mayor. In another case the Ministry of Energy issued a permit for work that was &to reinforce energy lines,8 although Hamadeh says that was clearly not true. Hamadeh says that the whole of the Bekaa valley was done with local permits, and installations were done by different groups, each unaware of what the others were doing. However, he also says that some of the work was done with the knowledge of resigned Minister of Energy Fneish, a Hizballah member.

DISCOVERY AND REPORT
--------------------

¶8. (S) The first official report was from the region of
BEIRUT 00000523 003 OF 004
Chouifat, which reported installation of an unknown fiber optic system, and asked the Minister of the Interior to stop it. No one did anything because, in Hamadeh’s opinion, they &had no guts.8 At the time of the earlier exposure of the Hizballah telephone lines running through Beirut, and even along the wall of the French embassy, the GOL asked Hizballah to remove those lines, which Hizballah did, and Hamadeh said that he believed at the time that would be the end of the network in the south. The full Ministry of Telecommunications report on the system was compiled by engineers in the ministry and othersXXXXXXXXXXXX who Hamadeh believes could be in great danger because of the report. Once again Hamadeh pointed out that there were no official reports yet from ISF Major General Rifi or LAF G-2 Brigadier General Khoury.

FUNDING FROM IRAN
-----------------

¶9. (S) The current installations, as per the map Hamadeh has given us, shows lines running from Beirut, around both sides of the airport, into the south below the Litani and back up through the Bekaa valley to the far north. It covers the Palestinian camps, and the Hizballah training camps in the Bekaa, and is penetrating deep into the Christian Metn and Ksarwan areas. Although Hamadeh says he has &a few names,8 he did not list the companies who are responsible for the installation, but said that information would be made available shortly. He cited the Iranian Fund for the Reconstruction of Lebanon as the source of the funding. This same group has been rebuilding roads and bridges since the July 2006 war with Israel, and has been accused before of installing telecommunications lines in parallel with new roads. Hamadeh said that he wants to get the list of companies involved and black list them with the GOL.

STRATEGIC VICTORY
-----------------

¶10. (S) Hamadeh highlights the system as a strategic victory for Iran, since it creates an important Iranian outpost in Lebanon, bypassing Syria. He sees the value for the Iranians as strategic, rather than technical or economic. The value for Hizballah is the final step in creating a nation state. Hizballah now has an army and weapons; a television station; an education system; hospitals; social services; a financial system; and a telecommunications system. As a sign of its confidence Hizballah official Safa told Khoury and Rifi that any move against the FiOS system would be taken as &an Israeli attack8 and dealt with accordingly. When Khoury and Rifi pointed out that the people in the area might not accept this and might show hostility to Hizballah in this case, Safa replied, &We don’t care; we will accept hostile reactions.8 At that point, according to Hamadeh, the GOL decided it needed to inform its friends and make a decision on the next steps to be taken.

HAMADEH PREPARES INTERNAL CAMPAIGN
-----------------

¶11. (S) Meanwhile, Hamadeh is preparing a &very strong8 internal campaign. This campaign, he said, has the potential to &destroy8 Aoun and mobilize Christians, as well as influence those Shia who are already beginning to worry about Hizballah. He is waiting for a March 14 meeting to discuss this campaign. Saad has apparently traveled to London and Geneva this week, and is expected to be back in Riyadh by 4/20. Saad has been out of Lebanon for some several weeks and it is not known when he will return. Hamadeh sees only two choices for the GOL: approach the UN Security Council directly, or take on Hizballah by cutting lines. But do the Lebanese security forces have the “guts” for that, or are they frightened by Safa’s statement that those actions would be considered an act of aggression, he wonders.

¶12. (S) Comment: Last year, when Hamadeh’s telecommunications ministry “discovered” the well-known Hizballah telephone system, including the line strung along the wall of the French embassy, he maintained that the GOL would not tolerate the erosion of its “last monopoly” by Hizballah, However, aside from the ceremonial cutting of the French embassy line, there was no further action. This time around, it appears that by sharing as widely as possible the details of the plan, the GOL may hope that someone else will take on the challenge. End cmment.
BEIRUT 00000523 004 OF 004
 
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000586

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO
USUN FOR WOLFF/PHEE/KUMAR

EO 12958 DECL: 04/30/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, KJUS, UNGA, SY, LE

SUBJECT: LEBANON: JUMBLATT ON POSSIBLE NEW UNSCR, NATIONAL
DIALOGUE; RIZK ON UNIIIC EXTENSION

REF: A. BEIRUT 584
¶B. BEIRUT 573

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------

¶1. (C) March 14 leader Walid Jumblatt questioned the utility of a new UN Security Council resolution on Lebanon if it does not address the border issue with Syria and if it does not contain strong language. He noted that the GOL had not yet agreed on whether an open session on the latest UNSCR 1559 report would be preferable to a closed session. Expressing his disappointment that Speaker Nabih Berri is refusing to meet majority leader Saad Hariri to discuss the National Dialogue, Jumblatt said he remains supportive of holding the Dialogue. He is hesitant about electing a president with a simple majority on May 13. Jumblatt was joined mid-meeting my Justice Minister Charles Rizk, who confirmed that the GOL is preparing to request the UN to extend UNIIIC’s mandate next week. Rizk added that he is extremely concerned about the safety of XXXXXXXXXXXX. End summary.

¶2. (C) The Charge, accompanied by PolOff, met with Druze leader Walid Jumblatt at his residence in Clemenceau on April 30. Justice Minister Charles Rizk, XXXXXXXXXXXX, Chief Justice Antoine Kheir, and Minister of Displaced Nehme Tohme joined the meeting.

HESITATION OVER A NEW UNSCR, OPEN DISCUSSION ON 1559
----------------------------

¶3. (C) Jumblatt questioned whether a new UN Security Council resolution focused on putting the Lebanon-Syria relationship on track (Ref A) would benefit Lebanon. He said that it would need to mention borders, an inclusion which might not have unanimous support. He expressed his fear that any new resolution would have “watered-down” language, and would quickly lose momentum, thereby becoming “obsolete, like past resolutions.” He also was noncommittal about whether the next UN session to discuss the latest UNSCR 1559 report should be open or closed, saying that the GOL had not yet agreed whether it was ready to discuss the border issue with Syria.

MARCH 14 MARCHING AHEAD
-----------------------

¶4. (C) “It is an injustice that Berri won’t see Saad,” complained Jumblatt. Noting that Sheikh Qabalan, head of the Higher Islamic Shia Council, had urged Berri in a telephone call to meet Saad, Jumblatt said even if Berri agrees, it won’t have the same impact. “They should have met yesterday,” he stated. Nevertheless, Jumblatt continued, you can’t say no to dialogue. Jumblatt said he believes a 13-7-10 cabinet division is “swallowable,” but that he suspects Berri won’t be able to deliver on this because Syria is waiting for the next U.S. administration and for parliamentary elections in Lebanon in hopes that it will be able to secure a more favorable division.

¶5. (C) Jumblatt stressed that a president must first be elected prior to discussing cabinet formation. Unsure about whether Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Michel Sleiman will accept an election by a simple majority, Jumblatt was silent when asked about March 14’s backup strategy. (Note: Saad’s plan is to go to parliament on May 13 and elect a president, with a simple majority if necessary, Ref B. March 14 members seem to be counting on General Sleiman’s acceptance, though he has not yet indicated his willingness. Jumblatt himself did not appear eager to pursue a simple majority election. End note.)

¶6. (C) Jumblatt reported that he will not see Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa when Moussa arrives in Beirut
SIPDIS May 1 because he is going to Jordan to see King Abdullah, and then hopes to meet Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abu Gheit. Nonchalant about the value of Moussa’s visit, he said he was hopeful that the Qataris now appear to be siding with March

BEIRUT 00000586 002 OF 003
14, “slowly but surely.” However, he wondered where French policy stands today.

HOW THE U.S. CAN HELP
---------------------

¶7. (C) When asked how the USG could best support Lebanon at this juncture, Jumblatt said he was pleased to see the USG’s recent public statements on Syria’s efforts to build nuclear weapons. Jumblatt half-jokingly said that the U.S. should now send the USS Nimitz to intimidate Syria. Jumblatt also suggested U.S. assistance for Lebanese prisons (in response to recent prison riots in Roumieh). Rizk added that a roadmap would be helpful to lay out how the U.S. can best support the Ministry of Justice (in addition to the ongoing $7 million USAID judicial training program).

¶8. (C) Jumblatt noted that the GOL had yet to receive the $1 billion central bank deposit promised by the Saudis. Minister Tohme opined that the holdup is due to “Saudi culture,” and the best way to get the money would be for Prime Minister Foaud Siniora to send his advisor, Mohammed Chatah, to spend four or five days sitting in Riyadh “to move things along.”

CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF UNIIIC
------------------------------

¶9. (C) Jumblatt said the Special Tribunal was “not enough” to intimidate Syria. Rizk chimed in to acknowledge that work on the Special Tribunal was “frightening to Syria until recently.” Both agreed that Syrian President Bashar Assad won’t care about the Tribunal in a year’s time. Rizk repeated his concerns that UNIIIC Commissioner Daniel Bellemare had stated to some that he “has no case.” Rizk said the U.S. can help by directing Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad to ask the UN SYG to impress upon Bellemare the importance of his role as prosecutor for the Tribunal.

¶10. (C) Rizk pointed out that Bellemare should not be disassociating UNIIIC from the detention of the four generals suspected of involvement in Rafiq Hariri’s assassination because the blame then falls squarely on XXXXXXXXXXXX

¶11. (C) The GOL had not yet formally agreed to send a letter to the UNSC requesting a six-month extension of UNIIIC’s mandate, Rizk reported, because the cabinet lacked the necessary quorum at its April 29 meeting. He said he had no doubt that the letter would be approved by the GOL, adding that Siniora had only made one edit to the letter (changing “as soon as possible” to “soon”). Rizk expressed his optimism about the letter’s success at the UNSC because he changed the language to state that the GOL “welcomes” Bellemare as prosecutor, instead of making a request; it’s a letter you can’t say no to, Rizk affirmed.

GOL STILL PONDERING HOW TO REACT TO HIZBALLAH FIBER OPTIC NETWORK
--------------------------------

¶12. (S) Meanwhile, in a separate conversation on Hizballah’s progress in establishing a fiber optic network, Siniora’s senior advisor Mohammed Chatah told Charge that the network was yet another example of Hizballah’s many infringements against the state. The network could thus not be separated from Hizballah’s military activities. A GOL public accusation against Hizballah would beg the same question as to why the GOL did not remove Hizballah’s tanks, and entailed military risks for the GOL. The UNSC could not remain neutral to reports of increasing illegitimate Hizballah activities, he noted, but the GOL would have to be the one to initiate the accusation. Chatah also said there was no clear strategy within the GOL on how to approach the problem, cited some disagreement between Defense Minister Murr and Telecom Minister Hamadeh.
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000586

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO
USUN FOR WOLFF/PHEE/KUMAR

EO 12958 DECL: 04/30/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, KJUS, UNGA, SY, LE

SUBJECT: LEBANON: JUMBLATT ON POSSIBLE NEW UNSCR, NATIONAL
DIALOGUE; RIZK ON UNIIIC EXTENSION

REF: A. BEIRUT 584
¶B. BEIRUT 573

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------

¶1. (C) March 14 leader Walid Jumblatt questioned the utility of a new UN Security Council resolution on Lebanon if it does not address the border issue with Syria and if it does not contain strong language. He noted that the GOL had not yet agreed on whether an open session on the latest UNSCR 1559 report would be preferable to a closed session. Expressing his disappointment that Speaker Nabih Berri is refusing to meet majority leader Saad Hariri to discuss the National Dialogue, Jumblatt said he remains supportive of holding the Dialogue. He is hesitant about electing a president with a simple majority on May 13. Jumblatt was joined mid-meeting my Justice Minister Charles Rizk, who confirmed that the GOL is preparing to request the UN to extend UNIIIC’s mandate next week. Rizk added that he is extremely concerned about the safety of XXXXXXXXXXXX. End summary.

¶2. (C) The Charge, accompanied by PolOff, met with Druze leader Walid Jumblatt at his residence in Clemenceau on April 30. Justice Minister Charles Rizk, XXXXXXXXXXXX, Chief Justice Antoine Kheir, and Minister of Displaced Nehme Tohme joined the meeting.

HESITATION OVER A NEW UNSCR, OPEN DISCUSSION ON 1559
----------------------------

¶3. (C) Jumblatt questioned whether a new UN Security Council resolution focused on putting the Lebanon-Syria relationship on track (Ref A) would benefit Lebanon. He said that it would need to mention borders, an inclusion which might not have unanimous support. He expressed his fear that any new resolution would have “watered-down” language, and would quickly lose momentum, thereby becoming “obsolete, like past resolutions.” He also was noncommittal about whether the next UN session to discuss the latest UNSCR 1559 report should be open or closed, saying that the GOL had not yet agreed whether it was ready to discuss the border issue with Syria.

MARCH 14 MARCHING AHEAD
-----------------------

¶4. (C) “It is an injustice that Berri won’t see Saad,” complained Jumblatt. Noting that Sheikh Qabalan, head of the Higher Islamic Shia Council, had urged Berri in a telephone call to meet Saad, Jumblatt said even if Berri agrees, it won’t have the same impact. “They should have met yesterday,” he stated. Nevertheless, Jumblatt continued, you can’t say no to dialogue. Jumblatt said he believes a 13-7-10 cabinet division is “swallowable,” but that he suspects Berri won’t be able to deliver on this because Syria is waiting for the next U.S. administration and for parliamentary elections in Lebanon in hopes that it will be able to secure a more favorable division.

¶5. (C) Jumblatt stressed that a president must first be elected prior to discussing cabinet formation. Unsure about whether Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Michel Sleiman will accept an election by a simple majority, Jumblatt was silent when asked about March 14’s backup strategy. (Note: Saad’s plan is to go to parliament on May 13 and elect a president, with a simple majority if necessary, Ref B. March 14 members seem to be counting on General Sleiman’s acceptance, though he has not yet indicated his willingness. Jumblatt himself did not appear eager to pursue a simple majority election. End note.)

¶6. (C) Jumblatt reported that he will not see Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa when Moussa arrives in Beirut
SIPDIS May 1 because he is going to Jordan to see King Abdullah, and then hopes to meet Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abu Gheit. Nonchalant about the value of Moussa’s visit, he said he was hopeful that the Qataris now appear to be siding with March

BEIRUT 00000586 002 OF 003
14, “slowly but surely.” However, he wondered where French policy stands today.

HOW THE U.S. CAN HELP
---------------------

¶7. (C) When asked how the USG could best support Lebanon at this juncture, Jumblatt said he was pleased to see the USG’s recent public statements on Syria’s efforts to build nuclear weapons. Jumblatt half-jokingly said that the U.S. should now send the USS Nimitz to intimidate Syria. Jumblatt also suggested U.S. assistance for Lebanese prisons (in response to recent prison riots in Roumieh). Rizk added that a roadmap would be helpful to lay out how the U.S. can best support the Ministry of Justice (in addition to the ongoing $7 million USAID judicial training program).

¶8. (C) Jumblatt noted that the GOL had yet to receive the $1 billion central bank deposit promised by the Saudis. Minister Tohme opined that the holdup is due to “Saudi culture,” and the best way to get the money would be for Prime Minister Foaud Siniora to send his advisor, Mohammed Chatah, to spend four or five days sitting in Riyadh “to move things along.”

CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF UNIIIC
------------------------------

¶9. (C) Jumblatt said the Special Tribunal was “not enough” to intimidate Syria. Rizk chimed in to acknowledge that work on the Special Tribunal was “frightening to Syria until recently.” Both agreed that Syrian President Bashar Assad won’t care about the Tribunal in a year’s time. Rizk repeated his concerns that UNIIIC Commissioner Daniel Bellemare had stated to some that he “has no case.” Rizk said the U.S. can help by directing Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad to ask the UN SYG to impress upon Bellemare the importance of his role as prosecutor for the Tribunal.

¶10. (C) Rizk pointed out that Bellemare should not be disassociating UNIIIC from the detention of the four generals suspected of involvement in Rafiq Hariri’s assassination because the blame then falls squarely on XXXXXXXXXXXX

¶11. (C) The GOL had not yet formally agreed to send a letter to the UNSC requesting a six-month extension of UNIIIC’s mandate, Rizk reported, because the cabinet lacked the necessary quorum at its April 29 meeting. He said he had no doubt that the letter would be approved by the GOL, adding that Siniora had only made one edit to the letter (changing “as soon as possible” to “soon”). Rizk expressed his optimism about the letter’s success at the UNSC because he changed the language to state that the GOL “welcomes” Bellemare as prosecutor, instead of making a request; it’s a letter you can’t say no to, Rizk affirmed.

GOL STILL PONDERING HOW TO REACT TO HIZBALLAH FIBER OPTIC NETWORK
--------------------------------

¶12. (S) Meanwhile, in a separate conversation on Hizballah’s progress in establishing a fiber optic network, Siniora’s senior advisor Mohammed Chatah told Charge that the network was yet another example of Hizballah’s many infringements against the state. The network could thus not be separated from Hizballah’s military activities. A GOL public accusation against Hizballah would beg the same question as to why the GOL did not remove Hizballah’s tanks, and entailed military risks for the GOL. The UNSC could not remain neutral to reports of increasing illegitimate Hizballah activities, he noted, but the GOL would have to be the one to initiate the accusation. Chatah also said there was no clear strategy within the GOL on how to approach the problem, cited some disagreement between Defense Minister Murr and Telecom Minister Hamadeh.
BEIRUT 00000586 003 OF 003
 
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER KWBG EG IR SA LE IS
SUBJECT: 40TH JPMG: NEA REGIONAL DISCUSSION (PART 3 OF 4)

Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

¶1. (S) Summary: As part of the 40th Joint Political Military
Group (JPMG), U.S. and GOI counterparts discussed security
issues in the Near East region. GOI officials expressed
support for the P5 plus 1 engagement process with Iran, but
doubted the process would lead to any change in Iranian
behavior -- Iran will use the engagement process as an
opportunity to continue its pursuit of a nuclear weapon.
Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs Andrew
Shapiro stressed that engagement with Tehran was not "open
ended"; the United States is preparing sanctions in the event
engagement does not prove successful. GOI interlocutors
continued to express concerns regarding U.S. support of the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF); U.S. participants reiterated
U.S. support of the LAF as a counterweight to Hizballah. A/S
Shapiro noted NEA, with PM participation and support, plans
to brief the GOI on the U.S. policy regarding Lebanon in the
near future. In a continuation from the JPMG Executive
Session, GOI interlocutors made the argument that U.S. arms
transfers in the region could potentially arm future enemies
of Israel. GOI officials expressed frustration over the
Goldstone Report; U.S. officials advocated sharing lessons
learned regarding confronting terrorists in
civilian-populated areas. GOI officials noted improved
counter-smuggling efforts from Egypt regarding arms transfers
to Gaza via the Sinai. However, they argued that Egypt can
and should do more to prevent the flow of arms. U.S.
delegation members also briefed on U.S. policy in Iraq, and
expressed concerns about the current situation in Yemen.
This is the third of four cables (septels) reporting on the
JPMG. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) Main Israeli Participants:

-- Brigadier General (res) Pinchas Buchris, MOD Director
General
-- Major General (ret) Amos Gilad, MOD Political-Military
Chief
-- Brigadier General Ronen Dan, acting Israeli Defense
Attache to the United States
-- Gad Dovev, Director, MOD Mission, New York
-- Alon Bar, MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs
-- COL Shimon Arad, IDF J5
-- Rami Yungman, MOD Political-Military Bureau
-- Schmuel Royter, Assistant to the MOD Director General

Main U.S. Participants:

-- Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs
-- James Hursch, Director, DTSA
-- Dr. Colin Kahl, International Security Affairs, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense
-- Brigadier General Jefforey Smith, Joint Staff
-- Beth McCormick, Deputy Director, DSCA
-- Prem Kumar, Director for Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian
and Jordanian Affairs, NSC
-- Tom Goldberger, Director for Israel and Palestinian
Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
-- COL Richard Burgess, Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv
-- Robert Maggi, PM Coordinator for Counter Piracy
-- Kevin Maloney, Licensing Director, PM/DTCL

Plenary
-------

¶3. (S) MOD Director General Pinchas Buchris began the
plenary, stating this was "perhaps the most important JPMG to
date." He pointed to the threat of a nuclear Iran, and
expressed hope that U.S. leadership will find a way to stop
Iran. Otherwise, a nuclear-armed Iran will "impact the
stability of the world," Buchris said. A/S Shapiro described
this 40th JPMG as a key forum and the primary mechanism in
the political-military dialogue between the United States and
Israel. He said the United States wants to "re-energize" the
JPMG, with the goal to "bring back strategic elements" into
the discussion. A/S Shapiro highlighted the importance of
mutual understanding and transparent dialogue.

Iran
----

¶4. (S) MOD Political-Military Director Amos Gilad presented a
strategic overview. He began with Iran, reciting President
Obama's statement made during a visit to Israel prior to
becoming president that the United States would not tolerate
a nuclear Iran. Gilad said Israel concurs, and described
current dialogue with Iran as the "most sensitive stage" and
Iran's "last chance." He said Iran remains determined to

TEL AVIV 00002502 002 OF 004


reach the "nuclear option," which he described as
"intolerable." He quoted former President and Ahmadinejad
opponent Rafsanjani as saying Iran "only needs one bomb for
Israel," implying that Iran will continue to threaten Israel
regardless of its leadership.

¶5. (S) A/S Shapiro noted that the United States shares
Israel's concerns that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons
program. He said that the United States is beginning with
engagement, but at the same time is preparing tougher
measures should engagement fail. A/S Shapiro stressed that
engagement was not "open ended" -- the United States needs to
see concrete steps and tangible results from the P5 1 talks.
He noted concerns over the Qom facility; if Iran does not
respond to engagement, then the United States will move
toward stronger steps such as sanctions. DASD Kahl
reiterated that it is not our intention to allow Iran to "run
out the clock," and noted that engagement also serves to
build international consensus on sanctions. MFA Deputy
Director for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar argued that the
United States must present a clearer message to the Europeans
on what is expected of them regarding sanctions.

¶6. (S) A representative from Mossad said Tehran understands
that by reacting positively to engagement, Iran can continue
to "play for time" and avoid sanctions while pursuing its
strategic objective to obtain a military nuclear capability.
From Mossad's perspective, there is no reason to believe Iran
will do anything but use negotiations to stall for time so
that by 2010-2011, Iran will have the technological
capability to build a nuclear weapon -- essentially reducing
the question of weaponizing to a political decision. Mossad
said Iran's main crisis is in the political sphere -- the
current regime is weaker than prior to the elections, but
does not face significant risk as its security apparatus
remains loyal, while the opposition lacks a charismatic
leader. The goal of the regime, therefore, is to calm down
the domestic political environment -- Khamenei realizes the
frustration demonstrated following the elections has not
disappeared. BG Smith asked if Khamenei's death might change
the political landscape; Mossad noted no information to
suggest a change in Khamenei's health, while those
surrounding him appear more loyal than ever.

¶7. (S) Mossad believes Iran wants to become a regional
hegemon, and is dictating its agenda by using Hamas and
Hizballah as force multipliers. In that respect, Iran is
very creative in finding ways to transfer weapons systems to
its proxies. Mossad said Tehran also understands the effort
to split Syria from Iran's influence, and is working hard to
deepen its relationship with Syria as a result. DASD Kahl
argued that Iran is weaker regionally today than in recent
years. He noted progress in Iraq, the results of the recent
Lebanese elections, and outreach to Syria as signs of a
weaker Iran. DASD Kahl also noted increased U.S. credibility
in the Muslim world, while the crackdown following the
Iranian elections exposed the current regime as brutal to the
region and in Europe.

Hizballah/Lebanon/Syria
-----------------------

¶8. (S) Gilad addressed threats posed by "Hizballahstan" and
"Hamastan," noting that Hizballah/Hamas-Syria-Iran
cooperation has strengthened. He noted that rockets from
Lebanon can now cover the entire territory of Israel, while
ballistic missiles -- although not new -- remain Israel's
most serious threat with adversaries having the capability to
target Israeli citizens and major cities. IDF J5 Col Shimon
Arad noted four main trends in Lebanon: 1) internal political
deadlock since the elections; 2) Hizballah's growing military
capabilities; 3) Lebanon as a volatile military arena; and 4)
Lebanon's susceptibility to outside influences, including
Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. He recommended improved
US.-Israel coordination, and called for an exchange of views.
Arad also recommended creating Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
deconfliction measures, demanding improved LAF performance,
and exerting greater pressure on Syria and smuggling.
Finally, he called for sanctions on the Iranian Republican
Guard Corps (IRGC), trilateral meetings with the Lebanese and
UNIFIL to deter Hizballah, and bolstering UNIFIL by extending
Gen. Graziano's tour for an additional six months.

¶9. (S) A/S Shapiro acknowledged the GOI's desire for
specifics regarding U.S. policy on Lebanon, and hoped to
invite GOI representatives to Washington in the near future
for a full brief led by NEA, with PM participation and
support. He cited the need to provide an alternative to
Hizballah, which explains U.S. goals to strengthen the LAF as
a counterweight. DASD Kahl argued that any LAF cooperation

TEL AVIV 00002502 003 OF 004


with Hizballah is pragmatic given the LAF's current weakness.
He noted that U.S. assistance has been temporarily put on
hold since there is still no Lebanese government. Kahl also
argued that prospects for better relations with Damascus
depend on Syrian desires for better relations with the United
States and the return of the Golan Heights. Arad argued that
more must be done to weaken radicals and cease smuggling.
Gilad said the GOI cannot envision a government in Lebanon
without Hizballah, and said the LAF will come to the defense
of Hizballah if attacked by Israel -- thus, a strengthened
LAF hurts Israel.

QME
---

¶10. (S) Turning to U.S. regional arms transfers, Gilad
suggested Qualitative Military Edge (QME) as a "codename" for
potential threats against Israel. Israel currently enjoys
peace with regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates -- but the future is uncertain, and each
of these regimes faces the potential for change, he argued.
U.S. weapons -- "the best in the world" -- level the playing
field by reducing the need for training -- and could
ultimately aid a future enemy of Israel, Gilad said. A/S
Shapiro stressed the importance of transparency -- while
there may be differences between Israel and the United States
in terms of a regional assessment, the key is to ensure that
there are no surprises, he said.

Peace Process
-------------

¶11. (S) Gilad described the Middle East peace process as a
"pillar" of Israeli security. He quoted PM Netanyahu and
President Peres that Israel remains sincerely committed to
peace. Gilad noted however, that the re-launching of
negotiations is complicated by the split in Palestinian
leadership. He said a weak and corrupt PA had lost Gaza
despite Israeli warnings. Gilad said 2010 will prove pivotal
with Palestinian elections looming and Egyptian mediation
efforts to broker reconciliation between Hamas and the PA
having failed. That said, he noted that Israeli-PA security
and economic cooperation in the West Bank continues to
improve as Jenin and Nablus flourish, and described
Palestinian security forces as the "good guys." NEA/IPA
Director Tom Goldberger said Special Envoy Sen. Mitchell
continues his mission, and noted that Egyptian reconciliation
efforts were meant to strengthen the PA, not weaken it.

Goldstone Report
----------------

¶12. (S) Gilad addressed Israel's immediate neighbors within
the context of the Goldstone Report. He said Israel has
checked "all the details" of the report, and have concluded
that the report's accusations are "baseless." Buchris said
the report sets a bad precedent for countries trying to
protect its citizens from terrorists; he noted 300,000 phone
calls from the IDF to houses in Gaza ahead of strikes in the
effort to prevent civilian casualties -- "no other country
has taken such steps," Buchris argued. A/S Shapiro
highlighted strong U.S. opposition to the report's referral
to the UN Security Council, noting the report's biased
mandate.

¶13. (S) Gilad said Israel only entered Gaza after Hamas
violated the ceasefire or "tahdiya," which many Israelis felt
was "humiliating" and left Defense Minister Barak open to
criticism. Gilad characterized Operation Cast Lead as a
success that accounted for humanitarian issues; the IDF
showed restraint in the operation because Israel did not want
to re-occupy Gaza. DASD Kahl advocated sharing perspectives
and lessons learned on strategic communication to more
effectively confront terrorists in civilian-populated areas.
NSC Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs Prem Kumar
noted continued UNSC interest in the Goldstone Report, and
asked Israel to inform the United States on any additional
efforts or investigations the GOI was taking to help deflect
any further damage from the report.

Egypt/Counter-Smuggling
-----------------------

¶14. (S) Gilad said Israel was frustrated by its Arab
neighbors -- including specifically Egypt -- for supporting
the Goldstone Report, which complicates the peace process.
Israel continues to benefit from good security cooperation
with Jordan, he said. Gilad argued that Egypt could stop
smuggling into Gaza "completely," and questioned whether
Egypt should be judged by its efforts or results. Gilad

TEL AVIV 00002502 004 OF 004


stressed the latter, and argued Egypt can do more on
counter-smuggling. Finally, he noted Israeli concerns that
Egypt continues to prepare for a potential future military
confrontation with Israel, while no Egyptian military
officers visit Israel.

¶15. (S) A/S Shapiro outlined U.S. military assistance to
strengthen Egyptian border security, counter-terrorism,
peacekeeping and civil defense efforts. He said the United
States is working with Egypt to improve regional security
efforts, such as counter-smuggling. Regarding the Gulf
States and Saudi Arabia, A/S Shapiro stressed efforts to
improve energy security and counter-terrorism, while
bolstering the capabilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) in the face of the Iranian threat. Finally, he noted
U.S. withdrawal from the Anatolian Eagle exercise following
the Turkish decision to suspend the IDF's participation. A/S
Shapiro said the United States has been delivering the
message that Turkey must improve its relationship with
Israel.

¶16. (S) PM Counter-Piracy Coordinator Maggi briefed on the
counter smuggling technical discussion meeting (septel). He
cited the importance of working with Israel's neighbors --
including especially Egypt and Turkey -- to prevent Iranian
weapons from entering Gaza. Maggi said more pressure should
be applied in the EU and UN to gain more latitude -- and
possibly further action from the EU. He said tracking cash
flows, and increasing prosecutions and incarcerations were
important, with the ultimate goal of increasing cooperation
and momentum. Goldberger said Egypt sees Hamas as a national
security threat, and added that Egypt had closed 200 tunnels
since the beginning of 2009.

¶17. (S) Goldberger noted Egyptian domestic political
sensitivities, and questioned whether more commercial and
humanitarian goods could be allowed through the Gaza border
crossings. Gilad strongly stated that there were no limits
on commercial goods through the border crossings. Goldberger
asked about construction materiel like cement; Gilad said the
GOI would not allow Hamas to build bunkers -- goods such as
cement or iron would not be allowed because of their military
applications. He also argued that smuggling is a lucrative
business for all involved, including the Egyptian government,
and said the best way to stop the smuggling was to increase
arrests and incarcerations. Goldberger mentioned U.S.
economic and development assistance efforts in Sinai. He
noted that most requests to third countries to deny arms
transfer overflights are based on Israeli intelligence;
additional information/intelligence from the GOI would ensure
greater cooperation. Bar raised prosecuting shipping
companies complicit in arms transfers to Gaza; A/S Shapiro
said he would take that back to Washington for further
consideration.

Iraq/Yemen
----------

¶18. (S) On Iraq, DASD Kahl noted there are currently 125,000
U.S. soldiers in Iraq, which will be reduced to 50,000
soldiers by September 1, 2010 with complete U.S. troop
withdrawal by the end of 2011. He noted the U.S. goal of
establishing a long-term strategic relationship with a
sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. A/S Shapiro and
DASD Kahl briefed the GOI on U.S. efforts to assist the Iraqi
military to complete its counterinsurgency force, transition
the military to a force that can defend its borders, and
align the Iraqi military more closely to the United States.

¶19. (S) DASD Kahl pointed to the growing threat (al Qaida, al
Houthi insurgency, and southern secessionists) in Yemen. He
said the United States is attempting to prevent Yemen from
heading toward an "Afghanistan-type scenario" with general
lawlessness and increased ungoverned spaces. BG Smith noted
that al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to
fester in North and sub-Saharan Africa. He said Egypt is
actively involved in countering AQIM with 3,800 soldiers in
Sudan -- this should be encouraged and expanded.

¶20. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared on this cable.


CUNNINGHAM
 
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER KWBG EG IR SA LE IS
SUBJECT: 40TH JPMG: NEA REGIONAL DISCUSSION (PART 3 OF 4)

Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

¶1. (S) Summary: As part of the 40th Joint Political Military
Group (JPMG), U.S. and GOI counterparts discussed security
issues in the Near East region. GOI officials expressed
support for the P5 plus 1 engagement process with Iran, but
doubted the process would lead to any change in Iranian
behavior -- Iran will use the engagement process as an
opportunity to continue its pursuit of a nuclear weapon.
Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs Andrew
Shapiro stressed that engagement with Tehran was not "open
ended"; the United States is preparing sanctions in the event
engagement does not prove successful. GOI interlocutors
continued to express concerns regarding U.S. support of the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF); U.S. participants reiterated
U.S. support of the LAF as a counterweight to Hizballah. A/S
Shapiro noted NEA, with PM participation and support, plans
to brief the GOI on the U.S. policy regarding Lebanon in the
near future. In a continuation from the JPMG Executive
Session, GOI interlocutors made the argument that U.S. arms
transfers in the region could potentially arm future enemies
of Israel. GOI officials expressed frustration over the
Goldstone Report; U.S. officials advocated sharing lessons
learned regarding confronting terrorists in
civilian-populated areas. GOI officials noted improved
counter-smuggling efforts from Egypt regarding arms transfers
to Gaza via the Sinai. However, they argued that Egypt can
and should do more to prevent the flow of arms. U.S.
delegation members also briefed on U.S. policy in Iraq, and
expressed concerns about the current situation in Yemen.
This is the third of four cables (septels) reporting on the
JPMG. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) Main Israeli Participants:

-- Brigadier General (res) Pinchas Buchris, MOD Director
General
-- Major General (ret) Amos Gilad, MOD Political-Military
Chief
-- Brigadier General Ronen Dan, acting Israeli Defense
Attache to the United States
-- Gad Dovev, Director, MOD Mission, New York
-- Alon Bar, MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs
-- COL Shimon Arad, IDF J5
-- Rami Yungman, MOD Political-Military Bureau
-- Schmuel Royter, Assistant to the MOD Director General

Main U.S. Participants:

-- Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs
-- James Hursch, Director, DTSA
-- Dr. Colin Kahl, International Security Affairs, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense
-- Brigadier General Jefforey Smith, Joint Staff
-- Beth McCormick, Deputy Director, DSCA
-- Prem Kumar, Director for Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian
and Jordanian Affairs, NSC
-- Tom Goldberger, Director for Israel and Palestinian
Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
-- COL Richard Burgess, Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv
-- Robert Maggi, PM Coordinator for Counter Piracy
-- Kevin Maloney, Licensing Director, PM/DTCL

Plenary
-------

¶3. (S) MOD Director General Pinchas Buchris began the
plenary, stating this was "perhaps the most important JPMG to
date." He pointed to the threat of a nuclear Iran, and
expressed hope that U.S. leadership will find a way to stop
Iran. Otherwise, a nuclear-armed Iran will "impact the
stability of the world," Buchris said. A/S Shapiro described
this 40th JPMG as a key forum and the primary mechanism in
the political-military dialogue between the United States and
Israel. He said the United States wants to "re-energize" the
JPMG, with the goal to "bring back strategic elements" into
the discussion. A/S Shapiro highlighted the importance of
mutual understanding and transparent dialogue.

Iran
----

¶4. (S) MOD Political-Military Director Amos Gilad presented a
strategic overview. He began with Iran, reciting President
Obama's statement made during a visit to Israel prior to
becoming president that the United States would not tolerate
a nuclear Iran. Gilad said Israel concurs, and described
current dialogue with Iran as the "most sensitive stage" and
Iran's "last chance." He said Iran remains determined to

TEL AVIV 00002502 002 OF 004


reach the "nuclear option," which he described as
"intolerable." He quoted former President and Ahmadinejad
opponent Rafsanjani as saying Iran "only needs one bomb for
Israel," implying that Iran will continue to threaten Israel
regardless of its leadership.

¶5. (S) A/S Shapiro noted that the United States shares
Israel's concerns that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons
program. He said that the United States is beginning with
engagement, but at the same time is preparing tougher
measures should engagement fail. A/S Shapiro stressed that
engagement was not "open ended" -- the United States needs to
see concrete steps and tangible results from the P5 1 talks.
He noted concerns over the Qom facility; if Iran does not
respond to engagement, then the United States will move
toward stronger steps such as sanctions. DASD Kahl
reiterated that it is not our intention to allow Iran to "run
out the clock," and noted that engagement also serves to
build international consensus on sanctions. MFA Deputy
Director for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar argued that the
United States must present a clearer message to the Europeans
on what is expected of them regarding sanctions.

¶6. (S) A representative from Mossad said Tehran understands
that by reacting positively to engagement, Iran can continue
to "play for time" and avoid sanctions while pursuing its
strategic objective to obtain a military nuclear capability.
From Mossad's perspective, there is no reason to believe Iran
will do anything but use negotiations to stall for time so
that by 2010-2011, Iran will have the technological
capability to build a nuclear weapon -- essentially reducing
the question of weaponizing to a political decision. Mossad
said Iran's main crisis is in the political sphere -- the
current regime is weaker than prior to the elections, but
does not face significant risk as its security apparatus
remains loyal, while the opposition lacks a charismatic
leader. The goal of the regime, therefore, is to calm down
the domestic political environment -- Khamenei realizes the
frustration demonstrated following the elections has not
disappeared. BG Smith asked if Khamenei's death might change
the political landscape; Mossad noted no information to
suggest a change in Khamenei's health, while those
surrounding him appear more loyal than ever.

¶7. (S) Mossad believes Iran wants to become a regional
hegemon, and is dictating its agenda by using Hamas and
Hizballah as force multipliers. In that respect, Iran is
very creative in finding ways to transfer weapons systems to
its proxies. Mossad said Tehran also understands the effort
to split Syria from Iran's influence, and is working hard to
deepen its relationship with Syria as a result. DASD Kahl
argued that Iran is weaker regionally today than in recent
years. He noted progress in Iraq, the results of the recent
Lebanese elections, and outreach to Syria as signs of a
weaker Iran. DASD Kahl also noted increased U.S. credibility
in the Muslim world, while the crackdown following the
Iranian elections exposed the current regime as brutal to the
region and in Europe.

Hizballah/Lebanon/Syria
-----------------------

¶8. (S) Gilad addressed threats posed by "Hizballahstan" and
"Hamastan," noting that Hizballah/Hamas-Syria-Iran
cooperation has strengthened. He noted that rockets from
Lebanon can now cover the entire territory of Israel, while
ballistic missiles -- although not new -- remain Israel's
most serious threat with adversaries having the capability to
target Israeli citizens and major cities. IDF J5 Col Shimon
Arad noted four main trends in Lebanon: 1) internal political
deadlock since the elections; 2) Hizballah's growing military
capabilities; 3) Lebanon as a volatile military arena; and 4)
Lebanon's susceptibility to outside influences, including
Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. He recommended improved
US.-Israel coordination, and called for an exchange of views.
Arad also recommended creating Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
deconfliction measures, demanding improved LAF performance,
and exerting greater pressure on Syria and smuggling.
Finally, he called for sanctions on the Iranian Republican
Guard Corps (IRGC), trilateral meetings with the Lebanese and
UNIFIL to deter Hizballah, and bolstering UNIFIL by extending
Gen. Graziano's tour for an additional six months.

¶9. (S) A/S Shapiro acknowledged the GOI's desire for
specifics regarding U.S. policy on Lebanon, and hoped to
invite GOI representatives to Washington in the near future
for a full brief led by NEA, with PM participation and
support. He cited the need to provide an alternative to
Hizballah, which explains U.S. goals to strengthen the LAF as
a counterweight. DASD Kahl argued that any LAF cooperation

TEL AVIV 00002502 003 OF 004


with Hizballah is pragmatic given the LAF's current weakness.
He noted that U.S. assistance has been temporarily put on
hold since there is still no Lebanese government. Kahl also
argued that prospects for better relations with Damascus
depend on Syrian desires for better relations with the United
States and the return of the Golan Heights. Arad argued that
more must be done to weaken radicals and cease smuggling.
Gilad said the GOI cannot envision a government in Lebanon
without Hizballah, and said the LAF will come to the defense
of Hizballah if attacked by Israel -- thus, a strengthened
LAF hurts Israel.

QME
---

¶10. (S) Turning to U.S. regional arms transfers, Gilad
suggested Qualitative Military Edge (QME) as a "codename" for
potential threats against Israel. Israel currently enjoys
peace with regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates -- but the future is uncertain, and each
of these regimes faces the potential for change, he argued.
U.S. weapons -- "the best in the world" -- level the playing
field by reducing the need for training -- and could
ultimately aid a future enemy of Israel, Gilad said. A/S
Shapiro stressed the importance of transparency -- while
there may be differences between Israel and the United States
in terms of a regional assessment, the key is to ensure that
there are no surprises, he said.

Peace Process
-------------

¶11. (S) Gilad described the Middle East peace process as a
"pillar" of Israeli security. He quoted PM Netanyahu and
President Peres that Israel remains sincerely committed to
peace. Gilad noted however, that the re-launching of
negotiations is complicated by the split in Palestinian
leadership. He said a weak and corrupt PA had lost Gaza
despite Israeli warnings. Gilad said 2010 will prove pivotal
with Palestinian elections looming and Egyptian mediation
efforts to broker reconciliation between Hamas and the PA
having failed. That said, he noted that Israeli-PA security
and economic cooperation in the West Bank continues to
improve as Jenin and Nablus flourish, and described
Palestinian security forces as the "good guys." NEA/IPA
Director Tom Goldberger said Special Envoy Sen. Mitchell
continues his mission, and noted that Egyptian reconciliation
efforts were meant to strengthen the PA, not weaken it.

Goldstone Report
----------------

¶12. (S) Gilad addressed Israel's immediate neighbors within
the context of the Goldstone Report. He said Israel has
checked "all the details" of the report, and have concluded
that the report's accusations are "baseless." Buchris said
the report sets a bad precedent for countries trying to
protect its citizens from terrorists; he noted 300,000 phone
calls from the IDF to houses in Gaza ahead of strikes in the
effort to prevent civilian casualties -- "no other country
has taken such steps," Buchris argued. A/S Shapiro
highlighted strong U.S. opposition to the report's referral
to the UN Security Council, noting the report's biased
mandate.

¶13. (S) Gilad said Israel only entered Gaza after Hamas
violated the ceasefire or "tahdiya," which many Israelis felt
was "humiliating" and left Defense Minister Barak open to
criticism. Gilad characterized Operation Cast Lead as a
success that accounted for humanitarian issues; the IDF
showed restraint in the operation because Israel did not want
to re-occupy Gaza. DASD Kahl advocated sharing perspectives
and lessons learned on strategic communication to more
effectively confront terrorists in civilian-populated areas.
NSC Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs Prem Kumar
noted continued UNSC interest in the Goldstone Report, and
asked Israel to inform the United States on any additional
efforts or investigations the GOI was taking to help deflect
any further damage from the report.

Egypt/Counter-Smuggling
-----------------------

¶14. (S) Gilad said Israel was frustrated by its Arab
neighbors -- including specifically Egypt -- for supporting
the Goldstone Report, which complicates the peace process.
Israel continues to benefit from good security cooperation
with Jordan, he said. Gilad argued that Egypt could stop
smuggling into Gaza "completely," and questioned whether
Egypt should be judged by its efforts or results. Gilad

TEL AVIV 00002502 004 OF 004


stressed the latter, and argued Egypt can do more on
counter-smuggling. Finally, he noted Israeli concerns that
Egypt continues to prepare for a potential future military
confrontation with Israel, while no Egyptian military
officers visit Israel.

¶15. (S) A/S Shapiro outlined U.S. military assistance to
strengthen Egyptian border security, counter-terrorism,
peacekeeping and civil defense efforts. He said the United
States is working with Egypt to improve regional security
efforts, such as counter-smuggling. Regarding the Gulf
States and Saudi Arabia, A/S Shapiro stressed efforts to
improve energy security and counter-terrorism, while
bolstering the capabilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) in the face of the Iranian threat. Finally, he noted
U.S. withdrawal from the Anatolian Eagle exercise following
the Turkish decision to suspend the IDF's participation. A/S
Shapiro said the United States has been delivering the
message that Turkey must improve its relationship with
Israel.

¶16. (S) PM Counter-Piracy Coordinator Maggi briefed on the
counter smuggling technical discussion meeting (septel). He
cited the importance of working with Israel's neighbors --
including especially Egypt and Turkey -- to prevent Iranian
weapons from entering Gaza. Maggi said more pressure should
be applied in the EU and UN to gain more latitude -- and
possibly further action from the EU. He said tracking cash
flows, and increasing prosecutions and incarcerations were
important, with the ultimate goal of increasing cooperation
and momentum. Goldberger said Egypt sees Hamas as a national
security threat, and added that Egypt had closed 200 tunnels
since the beginning of 2009.

¶17. (S) Goldberger noted Egyptian domestic political
sensitivities, and questioned whether more commercial and
humanitarian goods could be allowed through the Gaza border
crossings. Gilad strongly stated that there were no limits
on commercial goods through the border crossings. Goldberger
asked about construction materiel like cement; Gilad said the
GOI would not allow Hamas to build bunkers -- goods such as
cement or iron would not be allowed because of their military
applications. He also argued that smuggling is a lucrative
business for all involved, including the Egyptian government,
and said the best way to stop the smuggling was to increase
arrests and incarcerations. Goldberger mentioned U.S.
economic and development assistance efforts in Sinai. He
noted that most requests to third countries to deny arms
transfer overflights are based on Israeli intelligence;
additional information/intelligence from the GOI would ensure
greater cooperation. Bar raised prosecuting shipping
companies complicit in arms transfers to Gaza; A/S Shapiro
said he would take that back to Washington for further
consideration.

Iraq/Yemen
----------

¶18. (S) On Iraq, DASD Kahl noted there are currently 125,000
U.S. soldiers in Iraq, which will be reduced to 50,000
soldiers by September 1, 2010 with complete U.S. troop
withdrawal by the end of 2011. He noted the U.S. goal of
establishing a long-term strategic relationship with a
sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. A/S Shapiro and
DASD Kahl briefed the GOI on U.S. efforts to assist the Iraqi
military to complete its counterinsurgency force, transition
the military to a force that can defend its borders, and
align the Iraqi military more closely to the United States.

¶19. (S) DASD Kahl pointed to the growing threat (al Qaida, al
Houthi insurgency, and southern secessionists) in Yemen. He
said the United States is attempting to prevent Yemen from
heading toward an "Afghanistan-type scenario" with general
lawlessness and increased ungoverned spaces. BG Smith noted
that al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to
fester in North and sub-Saharan Africa. He said Egypt is
actively involved in countering AQIM with 3,800 soldiers in
Sudan -- this should be encouraged and expanded.

¶20. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared on this cable.


CUNNINGHAM
 
Qadhafi Incorporated Lifestyle
------------------------------------------

¶10. (C) Qadhafi himself keeps a low profile in Tripoli. The Bab al-Azizia compound has facilities for banquets and other public events, but it is not lavish in any way compared with the ostentation of the Gulf oil state families or Hariri clan. Qadhafi’s wife travels by chartered jet in Libya, with a motorcade of Mercedes waiting to pick her up at the airport and take her to the destination, but her movements are limited and discrete. She hosted a banquet for diplomatic women in the Bab al-Azizia compound on the occasion of the al-Fatah (Revolution) holiday in September that was festive but not extravagant. Since the family keeps a tight control on the media and most of the Qadhafi children spending excesses take place outside Libya, there is not much public reaction to the coffers of Qadhafi Inc. Compared to egregious pillaging of State coffers elsewhere in Africa, or the lavish spending of Gulf Arabs, the Libyans don’t see much to complain about in their leader’s lifestyle, as long as he does a good job of making sure other people get a piece of the pie. And when Libyans do complain, they are removed from access to financial rewards.

-------------
Comment
-------------

¶11. (S) The financial interests of Qadhafi and his key allies present opportunites and challenges for reform efforts in Libya. At a minimum, it seems safe to say that reform will have its ups and downs over the long-term, as individual, regime and national interests come into play. If and when foreign publications do become available in Libya, there will be a financial gain for Saif. At the same time, the family will still have control over monitoring what information is released to the public. Over the long term, demand for more outside information would inevitably create pressure for open access and more press freedom. Similarly, Libya has a stated commitment to moving forward with WTO accession and joining international financial organizations. But it is doing so on its own timetable, a slow timetable. Reported septel, the General People’s Congress just passed in April 2006 new agency and representation rules that run counter to WTO principles. While the General General People’s Committee for Economy and Trade has working groups actively revising legislation to prepare for WTO accession, it will take some time to reconcile all the different structures of the Jamahiriya government (translation: “State of the Masses”). Libyan government officials have been telling P/E Chief for 10 months that the WTO accession will be presented in Geneva “in a few weeks, that only the translation has to be finished.” Institutional development is very primitive and the Libyans have a cultural and social preference for elements of distributive economy, placing great value on financial rewards that flow from affiliation with regime leadership, security services etc. There was a shipment of BMWs delivered to the government in early 2006, for example, and it seems likely that the young men driving them around town got the vehicles “distributed” through their affilation with different government entities. With regard to reform partnership efforts, there are the greatest opportunities to promote positive change by engaging in the Central Bank’s efforts to establish banking controls and standards, partnering with the General People’s Committee for Manpower and Training on civil service reform, and cooperating with the General People’s Committee for Economy and Trade in its WTO accession efforts.

BERRY GOLDRICH
 
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